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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
r;i_:y L. KIRKWOOD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 19,177 
PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action wherein Plaintiff-Appellant applied for 
unemployment compensation after being fired from his job with Helper 
City. Unemployment compensation was denied on the basis of Section 
35-4-5-(b)(l), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended [Discharged for 
Misconduct]. 
DISPOSITION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING 
This matter was considered by a Job Service Representative 
•m July 4, 1982, by an Appeal's Referee on SepteMber 2, 1982, and 
bv the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah on 
April 19, 1983. This appeal is from the final decision of the 
-1-
Board of Review of the Industrial Comnission nf Ct~h. Jenvin~ 
Plaintiff-Appellant's appeal from the Appeal Rcfp1-cc's dL·c·i 
Number 83-A-3482, dated September 2, lg83. wherein the fin,: in._ 
and conclusions of the Job Service Representative were sust.1111(': 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks an Order of this Court reversin' 
the denials of unemployment compensation rendered below, or in the 
alternative, granting a new evidentiary hearing and remanding this 
matter for hearing on the merits of the case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Guy L. Kirkwood was employed by Helper Citv in 1972 and 
rose to the responsibility of Street Superintendent by 1977 and 
continued his employment without incident for nearly ten years. 
He was elected by the Helper City Employees to serve as a member 
of the Helper City Board of Appeals (this Board considered and 
ruled upon employee management disputes). In addition, Plaintiff-
Appellant was a lon~ time member of the Helper City Volunteer Fire 
Department. 
On July 1, 1982, Plaintiff-Appellant discovered that his 
wife was having an affair with another man, that she had removed 
all of the household furniture, dishes, beddin~ and food from the 
house of the parties, and that she had taken the two minor chi l.:Jre· 
of the parties and moved in with her lover. Plaintiff-Appellant 
was devastated. 
Plaintiff-Appellant missed work on Julv 1, 1982 ::rnd r:iade 
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11·rn.•cement~ to meet with an attorney on July 2, 1982 regarding his 
,r ic oroblems. Plaintiff-Appellant obtained a substitute to 
1· his Juties as Street Superintendent for July 2, 1982 in order 
L" meet with his counsel. At 7:00 a.m, on July 2, 1982, a newly 
elected Helper City Councilman, Jack Ori, appeared at the home of 
Plaintiff-Appellant and demanded that he meet with the Mayor and 
Cit'' Council at 9 00 a.m. Plaintiff-Appellant declined to attend 
the meeting because of his appointment with legal counsel and was 
sumrnaril:1 fired. 
Plaintiff-Appellant was knowledgeable about the termination 
policies of Helper City by virtue of his experience on the Appeals 
Board. This policy provided a three-step procedure in cases of 
emplovee misconduct, 
1. Verbal warning, 
2. \.lritten warning and one week suspension without 
pav, 
3. Hearing before the Mayor, Councilmen, and 
Appeals Board, 
None of these procedures were followed in this case. 
Plaintiff-Appellant applied for unemployment compensation 
from the Job Service representative on July 6, 1982. The represen-
t~tive refused to allow Plaintiff-Appellant to read or review any 
'tatements bv his employer, Helper City, and made the following 
f j nd i nt.J 
You were discharged from your job with Helper 
City on July 2, 1982 when you refused to meet 
with the Mayor and City Council after an 
-3-
unexcused absence. Such a reriue't 1··;is not 
unusual in that vou were the Stt·cet DepartmPnl 
Supervisor. 
From this finding, the Job Service representative cone [i;.Jc 
Under Section 35-4-5-(b)(l) you were discharged 
for an act or omission in connection with 
employment which is deliberate, willful or 
wanton, and adverse to the emplover's rightful 
interest. 
As a result of the foregoing conclusion, Plaintiff-Appell~c 
was denied any unemployment compensation. Plaintiff-Appellant had 
no funds for legal counsel, having been fired from his job, and 
having discovered that his wife had left him with a twelve month 
delinquency on house payments, the phone service having been 
terminated for non-payment, and having discovered numerous other 
outstanding bills which had not been paid by his wife prior to theic 
separation. Notwithstanding these difficulties, Plaintiff-Appellant 
sent letters to the various administrative hearing boards on August 
11, 1982 (See Page 38 - Record on Appeal), March 29, 1983 (See Pa.ee 
27 - Record on Appeal), April 29, 1983 (See Page 21 - Record on 
Appeal), and June 13, 1983 (See Page 4 - Record on Appeal), in an 
effort to present evidence regarding his claim for unemployment 
compensation and the wrongful treatment which he had received fru~ 
Helper City. 
Plaintiff-Appellant has been unemploved for fourteen mont~c 
since his termination by Helper Cit:1. Prior to Julv 1. 19'32 he h3.' 
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l•e<en a luva l and dedicated employee for over ten years. His efforts 
present evidence and have his case reviewed had been severely 
I 11111 ted by his modest reading and writing capabilities. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF-
~.PPELLANT' S DISCHARGE WAS FOR MISCONDUCT AS DEFINED BY SECTION 
34-4-5- (b) (1). 
The only evidence submitted to the Job Service Representa-
tive regarding the alleged grounds for termination was a payroll 
sheet which showed that Plaintiff-Appellant had worked five hours 
rather than eight hours on June 18, 1982 (See Page 29 - Record on 
Appeal). There was no evidence in the payroll sheets relating to 
July 1, 1982. In this case, there is no record of excessive 
absenteeism. There is a record that shows five hours work rather 
than eight hours on June 18, 1982. There is no record that prior 
warnings had been given to the Plaintiff-Appellant. In addition, 
Plaintiff-Appellant had arranged for a substitute to cover his 
employment responsibilities while he was seeking legal counsel to 
help resolve his domestic difficulties. 
In the case of Janucik v. Department of Emoloyment Security 
and Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 569 P.2d 
1112, the Court stated: 
It has frequently been held in other jurisdic-
tions that excessive absenteeism without good 
cause constitutes willful misconduct, particu-
larly where the employee fails to report to 
his employer, or continues to be absent or 
tardy after warnings by the employer. 
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In this case, the record shows one dav of five hours i-ather th"'' 
eight hours work. The re cord does not show a record () f an,, 111, 
whatsoever having been given the employee bv the emplover. rn 
addition, the domestic difficulties of Plaintiff-Appellant shoulrl 
certainly be considered as they relate to the issue of good cause 
and absenteeism. Furthermore, as stated in Plaintiff-Appellant's 
letter of June 13, 1983 (See Page 4 - Record on Appeal), Plaintiff-
Appellant asked for but was denied the right to read or review 
the statement of his employer as to the basis for his firing, thus 
denying him notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the 
finding of misconduct. 
POINT II. THE RECORD PERSUASIVELY SHOWS THE ACTION OF THE APPEALS 
REFEREE AND OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND 
UNREASONABLE, AND WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT IN THE RECORD. 
Plaintiff-Appellant perhaps made errors in judgment regardir. 
the finding of a substitute employee during a time of extreme 
marital conflict, but his action is more properly characterized as 
leaving work voluntarily, without cause, if anything. Moreover, the 
events of July 1, 1982 may constitute reasonable cause if fairlv 
considered. 
Plaintiff-Appellant is an unlearned man but has worked 
consistently and without incident as a Street Supervisor for 
Helper City for over ten years. He has limited training and 
ability in the basic skills of reading and writing. The substance 
of his evidence may be gleamed from the four letters previouslv 
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·Llerrl'J r<J 1A1ich he submitted to the various administrative 
r i rt','. bua r els From these letters, the Board of Review should 
cl e found an absence of willful and wanton conduct on the part of 
1·taintiff-Appellant. There was no finding whatsoever regarding 
~ulpability. Kirkwood's intent was not specifically considered by 
the Appeal's Referee nor by the Board of Review, therefore the 
determination of misconduct under Section 35-4-5-(b)(l) was wrong 
as a matter of law. In the case of Continental Oil Company v. 
Board of Review of the Industrial Conunission of Utah, 568 P.2d 
727, the Court found that the purpose of the Employment Security 
Act was: 
To cushion the effect of unemployment by 
the payment of benefits to a worker in the 
event of his unemployment. 
Citing a related case, Boyntan Cab Company v. Neubeck, 296 N.W. 636, 
the Court considered the meaning of misconduct and stated: 
If mere mistakes, errors in judgment, or 
in the exercise of discretion, minor and 
but casual or untentional carelessness or 
negligence, and similar minor peccadilloes 
must be considered to be within the term 
misconduct, and no such element as wantoness, 
culpability, or willfulness with wrongful 
intent or evil design is to be included as 
an essential element in order to constitute 
misconduct within the intended meaning of 
the term as used in the Statute, then they 
will be defeating as to many of the great 
mass of less capable industrial workers, 
who are in the lower income brackets and 
for whose benefit the act was largely de-
signed, the principal purpose and object 
under the act of alleviating the eyils of 
unemployment by cushioning the shock of a 
lav-off, which is apt to be the most 
serious to such workers. 
The Court in discussing the Boyntan case further stated 
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that, "a statute for a forfeiture should be 'itrictlv construed 
and the penal character of the provision should he minimi;o:cd b 
excluding, rather than including, conduct not clcarlv intended t. 
be within the provision." 
Based upon the foregoing principals, the Court stated in 
the Boyntan case: 
The intended meaning of the term misconduct 
is limited to conduct evencing such willful 
or wanton disregard of an employer's interest 
as is found in deliberate violations or dis-
regard of standards of behavior which the 
employer has the right to expect of his em-
ployee, or in carelessness or negligence of 
such degree or recurrence as to manifest 
evil culpability, wrongful intent or evil 
design, and to show an intentional and sub-
stantial disregard of the emoloyer's interest 
or the employee's duties and obligations to 
his employer. On the other hand, mere ineffi-
ciency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in 
good performance as a result of inability or 
incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negli-
gence in isolated instances, or good faith 
errors in judgment or discretion are not to 
be deemed misconduct within the meaning of 
the Statute. 
In the instant case, the Appeal's Referee did not find 
that Kirkwood's conduct showed a deliberate, willful, or wanton 
disregard of his employer's interests. Kirkwood's intent was not 
specifically considered by the Appeal's Referee and without a 
finding of culpability, the determination of misconduct was wrong 
as a matter of law. 
The Appeal's Referee and the Board of Review should have 
applied the "equity and good conscience" standard set out in the 
Employment Security Act and considered the reasonableness of 
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l.1irnant's actions. This they did not do. Despite claimant's 
''"' t Lonal incapacities in reading and writing, his letters do 
111 'lvLde evidence which should be judged by this standard. The 
record shows no such consideration. In the case of Salt Lake City 
~_rporation v. Department of Employment Security and Marion Lynch, 
b57 P Zd 1312, the Court discussed the standard of equity and good 
conscience and stated as follows: 
In determining what constitutes equity 
and good conscience, the commission must 
consider the reasonableness of the claim-
ant's actions . 
In this case, the Appeal's Referee refused to allow the 
Plaintiff-Appellant to read and review the stated grounds for 
termination submitted by Helper City, and in addition the Board 
of Review failed to consider the various letters submitted by 
Plaintiff-Appellant as evidence towards the issue of misconduct 
and a finding of culpability on the part of Plaintiff-Appellant. 
The record in this case does not provide support for a 
finding of misconduct on the part of Plaintiff-Appellant. Both the 
Continental Oil case and the Boyntan Cab Company case require that 
intent be specifically considered, and without a specific finding 
of culpability, the conclusion of misconduct was wrong as a matter 
of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully submits that the Job 
Service Representative's determination, the Appeal's Referee's 
decision and the decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial 
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Commission of Utah were in error as a matter of la>.v and that the 
denial of unemployment compensation tu Plaintiff-1\ppellant s]i,,11' 
be reversed, or in the alternative, this case should be remanded 
for an evidentiary hearing on the merits. 
DATED this 21st day of September, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRIAN C. HARRISON 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
to K. Allen Zabel at 174 Social Hall Avenue, Salt Lake Citv, Utah 
84147, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, postage prepaid, this 
23rd day of September, 1983. 
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